A quarter of a century ago, in 1998, Eric T. Young published a review essay in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute in which he argued that a “general military history” of Zimbabwe's war of independence (1965–1980) “remains to be written.” This remains largely the case today, particularly because of the lack of available archival sources. Crucial materials in the Rhodesian archives were deliberately destroyed at the end of the war by government and military officials or smuggled to South Africa. Likewise, the liberation movements’ archives remain closed to all but a handful of scholars, such as Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi.However, some smuggled Rhodesian archives have been made available to a wider group of researchers, affording an opportunity to fill this void. Charles D. Melson's book uses Rhodesian archival sources and interviews with Rhodesian veterans to good effect to shed light on some hitherto murky areas of the Rhodesian war effort.The book's main strength is its detailed discussion of Rhodesian military doctrine and practice. Chapter 2 adds significantly to the literature on combat tracking in the war, and chapter 3 deftly brings out the pivotal role of the Rhodesian Air Force. These vital aspects of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign have been overlooked in other texts. Melson also provides a good account of how the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) evolved as the war intensified. Chapter 4 provides an excellent discussion of the Fire Force that will captivate readers who are new to the conflict, but it does not offer anything new to the extant literature. Chapter 8, covering Rhodesian cross-border operations, provides a novel, chronological, Rhodesian view of these important battles.Elsewhere, the book plods along, with considerable space taken up by dull, lengthy, and laudatory quotations from senior Rhodesian officers regarding the bravery or competence of their peers or subordinates. A sharper editing pencil would have spared the reader some tedium here. Likewise, the discussion of inter- and intra-service friction is initially useful but much less so thereafter. A vast, intertextual, and self-referential “neo-Rhodesian” literature in which score-settling RSF veterans argue in exhaustive, and exhausting, detail about disputed aspects of the war already exists. This “neo-Rhodesian” canon was the subject of a recent forensic examination by Luise White, Fighting and Writing: The Rhodesian Army at War and Postwar (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2021). Melson's account complements White's book well, and readers who are particularly interested in the war would benefit from consulting both books.Fighting for Time states that it is targeted at readers in the “American defense establishment” and seeks to inform U.S. forces involved in contemporary counterinsurgency operations. However, the lessons that RSF doctrine holds for today's commanders is unclear. Much Rhodesian doctrine was developed to compensate for the RSF's specific weaknesses. For instance, paratroopers were used regularly in the intense latter phase of the war, but not for reasons of military efficacy. Sanctions-induced shortages meant that the Rhodesians simply did not have enough helicopters. Hence, the transport of airborne infantry on aged Dakotas (some saw action at Arnhem in WWII) was the only way for the overstretched Rhodesian army to ferry troops into battle. Beyond the general principle of “needs must,” it is difficult to see what RSF doctrine has to offer modern military thinkers.A great strength of Melson's book is his close connections with a large cast of former RSF personnel, with whom he has corresponded over decades and who provide great insight. However, a pronounced bias toward the views of senior officers comes at the expense of rank-and-file voices, despite Melson's argument early in the book “that it was a ‘four-star’ corporal's war depending heavily on junior leaders on the ground” (p. 3). In one respect, though, this approach is a strength, enabling him to offer a good picture of the “official mind” of the RSF, particularly when combined with archival sources.Melson's narrative is also notably sympathetic to the Rhodesian perspective. The back cover blurb notes that he—a former U.S. Marine Corps officer—is a recipient of “the Rhodesian Independence Commemorative Medal.” This ersatz award was struck on behalf of UK-based RSF veterans’ associations in 2009. An issuer states that it is awarded “to honour the contribution of each person who lived through the very trying times of Rhodesian independence between 1965 to 1979” (see Award Medals, “Rhodesian Independence Full Size Commemorative Medal,” https://www.awardmedals.com/rhodesian-independence-medal). Melson's bias is reflected in his prose; for example, repeatedly referencing guerrilla fighters by the Rhodesian pejorative term “terrorists” (pp. 63, 73, 94, 160, 185, 191).Greater engagement with the scholarly literature would have helped to mitigate the imbalance. In many cases, Melson uncritically accepts the (sometimes extraordinary) claims made in ex-Rhodesian testimony. Scrutiny of these sources—which frequently comprise personal correspondence or unpublished papers and cannot be followed up by other researchers—would have produced a more balanced account.Melson's conclusions also lean toward the RSF. He asserts that, “without a viable political solution, Rhodesian military actions only delayed the inevitable despite tactical victory” (pp. 7, 194–195), repeating a common Rhodesian lament that the war was lost not by soldiers but by politicians at Lancaster House. This tautology deserves a more critical analysis. Other scholars and ex-RSF writers have outlined in detail how, by the end of the war, the Rhodesians were heavily outnumbered and increasingly outgunned. Early RSF battlefield dominance was curtailed by the mid-1970s, as the liberation armies improved their tactical proficiency and became much better trained and equipped. As Melson chronicles (pp. 172–174), by the end of the war even the best Rhodesian units could no longer achieve “tactical victory.” Large-scale cross-border raids into Mozambique resulted in unsustainable losses of RSF personnel and of irreplaceable aircraft. Had the war continued beyond December 1979, the RSF would most likely have experienced tactical defeat.Lastly, Melson makes regrettably little effort to engage with the wider African studies literature. He claims that “the Mashona and the Matabele are the largest African tribal groups” (p. 9) in Zimbabwe. Anybody with a passing familiarity with the country or the relevant literature would point out that these supposed “tribes” are an artificial construct of early colonial administrators and that, in fact, Zimbabwe contains many polities with distinctive political and cultural histories. For instance, Chishona-speaking groups include, inter alia, the Karanga, Manyika, Korekore, and Zezuru. There is not, and never has been, a “Mashona tribal group.”Despite these cavils, Fighting for Time is a very good account of the wartime RSF and adds much to our knowledge of the workings of key units and doctrine development. The book is rather biased to the Rhodesian perspective, but it will nonetheless serve as a useful source for scholars of the war. I would also recommend it to those interested in Africa's liberation wars and Cold War–era counterinsurgency warfare in general.